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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Curtis Jackson appeals from the judgment of conviction, alleging that the district 
court erroneously denied his motion to strike a biased juror for cause. That error was 
not harmless because, despite Mr. Jackson's use of all his allotted peremptory strikes, 
two of the jurors who sat on his case were not impartial. 
The State miscomprehends Mr. Jackson's argument on appeal, believing it to be 
a challenge to the two jurors who sat on this case in a claim of fundamental error. That 
is not the case. The fact that two other jurors, whose biases are clear from the record 
and who did not unequivocally affirm their ability to be impartial in light of those biases, 
remained on the panel simply demonstrates that error in not removing Juror #34 for 
cause was not harmless. There is no independent challenge to their presence on the 
panel. As such, the only need for an analysis pursuant to Perry1 is to reveal and rely on 
the biases of Juror #54 and Juror #57, as they were not challenged below. It does not, 
however, make the entire claim one of fundamental error. The issue Mr. Jackson raised 
in this appeal was preserved by his motion to strike Juror #34. As a result of the State's 
misunderstanding of the argument on appeal, its arguments apply the wrong legal 
standards and rules to the issues. 
Additionally, the State contends that neither the juror Mr. Jackson sought to 
strike, nor the two who remained on the panel, were biased. However, questions 
remained as to the impartiality of each, since none gave unequivocal affirmations of 
their ability to remain entirely impartial. In fact, Juror #34 did not offer any affirmation of 
1 State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209,226 (2010). 
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impartiality at all in regard to her expressed predisposition to believe the alleged victim 
over Mr. Jackson and did not provide any affirmation of impartiality in that regard at all. 
When such questions as to a juror's impartiality exist, they are to be resolved in favor of 
the defendant. As such, because the district court's erroneous decision to not dismiss 
Juror #34 for cause was not harmless, this Court should vacate his conviction and 
remand this case for a new trial. 
Mr. Jackson also contends that the district court erroneously denied his Rule 35 
motion without appointing him counsel. The State's first contention is that the denial of 
Mr. Jackson's request for counsel was not erroneous simply because his submission 
was not notarized. The State's position is belied by case law, as well as a recent 
amendment to the relevant statute, which would now simply presume Mr. Jackson to be 
indigent. All this recognizes that the law is aimed at increasing access to counsel for 
indigent defendants. As such, substance trumps form in such filings, and the State's 
position holding form over substance, despite Mr. Jackson's explanation for the 
deficiencies (his inability, due to no fault of his own, to meet the form requirements and 
still timely file the motion). The information that Mr. Jackson provided should have been 
sufficient to merit the appointment of counsel to assist him in pursuing his Rule 35 
motion. 
The State also contends that the denial of counsel in the Rule 35 proceedings 
should stand because the motion was frivolous and was not accompanied by new or 
additional information. That assertion is flawed, however, since one of the reasons 
counsel should be appointed is to help the defendant marshal this sort of evidence and 
present it to the district court. As such, the question of whether counsel should have 
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been appointed should be addressed before a decision on the merits of the motion is 
reached. Furthermore, Mr. Jackson did provide new and additional information that was 
not presented during his trial and which should not have been presumed to have been 
considered by the district court. As such, this Court should, at least, remand this case 
so that Mr. Jackson may pursue his Rule 35 motion with the assistance of counsel. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Jackson's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but 
are incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES IN REPLY 
1. Whether the State has misunderstood the issue regarding the biased jury now on 
appeal, and it has applied the wrong legal standards as a result. 
2. Whether the State incorrectly asserted that the district court's decision to not 
dismiss Juror #34 for cause was appropriate because Juror #34 did not give an 
unequivocal affirmation that she could be impartial. 
3. Whether the State incorrectly asserted that the district court's decision to not 
dismiss Juror #34 for cause was harmless because Juror #54 and Juror #57 did 
not give unequivocal affirmations that they could be impartial. 
4. Whether the State incorrectly asserted that Mr. Jackson's filings were insufficient 
to merit the appointment of counsel on his Rule 35 motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The State Has Misunderstood The Issue Regarding The Biased Jury Now On Appeal, 
And It Has Applied The Wrong Legal Standards As A Result 
A. Introduction 
The State has apparently misunderstood Mr. Jackson's argument on appeal, 
and in so doing, applied the wrong legal standards and rules to this case. First and 
foremost, the issue on appeal addressing the biased jury only contends that the district 
court erroneously refused to dismiss Juror #34 for cause, not, as the State believes, a 
new challenge to Juror #54 and Juror #57. Therefore, the State's application of the 
fundamental error doctrine is misplaced. This issue was preserved for appeal by 
Mr. Jackson's motion to remove Juror #34 for cause, which was denied. Rather, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has held that such errors are subject to harmless error analysis. 
Second, in cases such as this, the harmless error analysis only asks whether 
there were biased jurors on the panel. The State's argument - that defense counsel's 
decisions as to the exercise of Mr. Jackson's peremptory strikes are tactical, and thus, 
not reviewable on appeal - is also mistaken. According to the United States Supreme 
Court and Idaho Supreme Court, it does not matter how those jurors came to be on the 
panel. The question in that regard is simply "Were any of the jurors biased." If there is 
a biased juror on the panel, the defendant's constitutional rights have been violated and 
the error is not harmless. As such, the manner in which the defense exercised its 
peremptory strikes is not relevant and does not prevent review of this issue. 
Finally, in arguing that the three jurors in question had offered sufficient 
assertions of impartiality to overcome their stated biases, the State contends that there 
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should be a presumption of impartiality once such an assertion is made. Far from 
supporting the State's contention, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently held to the 
contrary, finding that such affirmations are "not always dispositive" on the question of 
whether a juror is impermissibly biased. Therefore, there cannot be a presumption of 
impartiality; rather, the jurors' responses are subject to review to determine whether 
they failed to unequivocally assure the court that they could set aside their biases and 
decide the case with entire impartiality. Any question that remains as to the impartiality 
of a potential juror is to be resolved in the defendant's favor. After all, as the Court of 
Appeals has observed, the worst possible outcome erring in the defendant's favor is 
that one unbiased juror will be replaced by another unbiased juror, whereas, not doing 
so risks depriving the defendant of his constitutional rights. State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 
603, 610 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting People v. Johnson, 730 N.E.2d 932, 941 
(N.Y. 2000)). 
B. This Argument Was Preserved For Appeal And Is Subject To Harmless Error 
Analysis 
The Idaho and United States Supreme Courts have clearly established that the 
defendant has a claim on appeal when the district court erroneously denies his motion 
to remove a biased juror for cause. Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-89 (1988) 
(recognizing that the ultimate goal is to select an impartial jury, and only if the jury that 
sits is not impartial will there be a violation of the defendant's constitutional rights); 
State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 570 (1991) (affirming Idaho's use of the Ross 
framework); see a/so Nightengale v. Timmel, 151 Idaho 347, 353-54 (2011) (reaffirming 
Ramos). When the complained-of juror (in this case, Juror #34) was removed via a 
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peremptory strike, the erroneous denial of the motion to remove the juror for cause is 
reviewed pursuant to a harmless error analysis. Id. Specifically, the appellate court 
assesses whether the jurors who actually deliberated in the case were impartial. Id. If 
they were not, then the error was not harmless and conviction vacated. Id. 
The State believes that Mr. Jackson is asserting a separate error in seating Juror 
#54 and Juror #57. (See Resp. Br., p.13 ("[Mr.] Jackson has failed to demonstrate from 
the record that either Juror #54 or Juror #57 were biased against him, and, as such, has 
failed to establish that the seating of those jurors violated his constitutional right to an 
impartial jury.") (emphasis added).) That belief is erroneous; Mr. Jackson is not 
challenging the seating of Juror #54 or Juror #57. Rather, he has contended that the 
mere fact that those jurors were on the panel and that they had expressed biases 
against Mr. Jackson demonstrates that the denial of Mr. Jackson's motion to remove 
Juror #34 for cause was not a harmless violation of his rights. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 
85-89; Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570. This is a critical 
distinction which affects the applicable legal rules and standards, and so the distinction 
must be given effect. 
Pursuant to its erroneous belief in that regard, the State argued this case under a 
fundamental error framework. (See, e.g., Resp. Br., p.15 ("[Mr.] Jackson's claim of 
prejudice and, ultimately, his claim of fundamental error under Perry, necessarily fail").) 
However, since this issue is preserved and subject to harmless error analysis, those 
arguments are inapplicable to the issue on appeal. See Ross, 487 U.S. at 85-89; 
Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570; see a/so Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54. Perry's 
fundamental error test, see Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, applies only insofar as its 
7 
standards guide the determination of whether the fact that Juror #54 and Juror #57 were 
biased may be argued for the first time on appeal. While the particular question of their 
bias was not argued below, it is necessarily argued on appeal as part of the preserved 
challenge to the denied motion to strike Juror #34 for cause. See, e.g., Nightengale, 
151 Idaho at 353-54; see a/so State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 862 (Ct. App. 2009) 
(determining Mr. Adams's claim to not be preserved for appeal, distinguishing that case 
from Hauser, 143 Idaho 603, "because in Hauser, defense counsel moved to excuse 
the juror for cause, thereby preserving the issue for appeal," whereas Mr. Adams had 
made no such challenge). 
Therefore, Perry is only applicable insofar as determining whether Juror #54 and 
Juror #57's bias impacted an unwaived constitutional right, was clear from the record, 
and was prejudicial to Mr. Jackson. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. If so, then their bias 
may be argued for the first time on appeal. See id. The presence of a biased juror on 
the panel deprives the defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a full 
jury of twelve impartial and unprejudiced jurors. See, e.g., Ross, 487 U.S. at 85; 
Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365-66 (1966). Mr. Jackson did not waive those 
rights. (See generally R.) Therefore, the first prong of the Perry analysis is met 
once Mr. Jackson demonstrates that one of the jurors who sat on his case was, in fact, 
biased. Similarly, there is a reasonable possibility that a biased juror will decide the 
case according to her biases instead of on the governing law and evidence presented. 
See Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. All the defendant need show under the third prong of 
Perry is "a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial." 
State v. Day, 154 Idaho 476, 472 (Ct. App. 2013) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 226) 
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(emphasis in original). Therefore, the presence of a biased juror also demonstrates the 
prejudice. As such, if Mr. Jackson demonstrates that the bias of the two jurors who sat 
on his case is clear from the face of the record, the Perry standards allow that bias to be 
argued for the first time on appeal, in this case, to demonstrate that the decision to not 
remove a biased juror for cause was not harmless. 
Furthermore, once the defendant establishes that there was an error, the burden 
shifts and the State must demonstrate that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); State v. Joy, _ P.3d _, 2013 
Opinion No. 78, p.12 (2013). Id. at 12-13. As such, the State bears the burden to prove 
that none of the jurors on the panel were biased. See Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-
54; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570. It cannot meet that standard without bringing the 
question of Juror #54 and Juror #57's bias before this Court. And since questions about 
juror bias are resolved in favor of the defendant, see Hauser, 143 Idaho at 611, a 
decision to not review those jurors for bias is essentially a conclusion that the State 
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the error in this matter was harmless. 
See, e.g., Perry, 150 Idaho at 221 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24) ("where a 
constitutional violation occurs at trial, and is followed by a contemporaneous objection, 
a reversal is necessitated, unless the State proves 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained."') (emphasis in original); 
As a result, Mr. Jackson would be entitled to a new trial. Cf State v. Almaraz, 154 
Idaho 584, 598-99 (2013) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden to show the 
error was harmless and remanding the case for a new trial). 
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C. The Manner In Which Mr. Jackson Exercised His Peremptory Strikes Is Irrelevant 
To The Issue On Appeal 
In this case, the analysis under the harmless error test only addresses whether 
Juror #54 or Juror #57 was biased. See Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54; Ramos, 119 
Idaho at 570. However, the State erroneously contends that since defense counsel did 
not strike those jurors with a peremptory challenge, that was a strategic choice which 
bars consideration of the question on appeal. (See Resp. Br., pp.13-15.) That 
argument is erroneous. The United States Supreme Court made this issue clear: if one 
of the jurors on the panel is shown to have been biased and the defendant used all his 
peremptory challenges, then the biased juror was forced on the defendant in violation of 
his constitutional rights. Ross, 487 U.S. at 89. The presumption that logically follows 
from the requirement established in Ross - to exhaust the peremptory strikes in order to 
raise this type of challenge - is that defense counsel will be exercising the peremptory 
challenges to remove other jurors who the defense team believes are also biased. The 
only logical conclusion from this prerequisite, then, is that the way in which the 
peremptory challenges were exercised is not relevant. Adopting the State's perspective 
would mean that fulfilling the prerequisite required by the United States Supreme 
Court - exercising all the allotted peremptory challenges - would prevent the review 
that the Supreme Court intended to allow. See id. 
That is not to say, the general rule is not that the defense's choices regarding 
challenges to jurors are tactical and not questioned on review. See, e.g., 
State v. Adams, 147 Idaho 857, 861 (Ct. App. 2009). Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has decided that the general rule is not applicable in this particular scenario - where the 
defense actually does challenge a juror for cause, and that motion is erroneously 
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denied. See Ramos, 119 Idaho at 570 (citing Ross, 487 U.S. at 89); see a/so 
Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353-54 (reaffirming Ramos). Since Mr. Jackson did 
challenge a juror for cause, that motion was erroneously denied, and he used all his 
allotted peremptory challenges, his case falls into the special category of cases 
identified in Ross and Ramos. As such, the State's contention regarding the tactical 
choices in the use of the peremptory challenges is inapplicable to this appeal. 
D. The State Erroneously Argued For A Presumption Of Impartiality In Jurors Who 
Had Expressed Bias And Offered An Affirmation Of Impartiality 
When jurors admit bias, they may, upon further voir dire, also make an assertion 
of impartiality. See, e.g., Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. The State contends that 
"[u]nless a prospective juror indicates an inability to 'lay aside his impression or opinion 
and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court,' it is presumed the 
prospective juror is impartial." (Resp. Br., p.4 (emphasis added).) However, the Idaho 
Supreme Court has consistently held to the contrary: such affirmations are "not always 
dispositive" in resolving questions of juror bias. State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 70 
(2011 ); State v. Yager, 139 Idaho 680, 688 (2004); State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 
506 (1999). They definitely do not, as the State contends, establish a presumption that 
the juror can be impartial. See id. 
Certainly, the district court is entitled to rely on such affirmations in determining 
whether it would be appropriate for that particular juror to serve, but such an affirmation 
does not necessarily end the inquiry. See id. Rather, the juror's affirmation needs to be 
unequivocal and demonstrate the potential juror's ability to act with entire impartiality. 
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. While an affirmation by the juror could be sufficient to 
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reach that conclusion, such is not always the case. Some affirmations may not be 
unequivocal or may not demonstrate an ability to "act with entire impartiality . . .. " 
See, e.g., Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11 (determining that the juror's affirmation that he 
would "try" to be impartial was insufficient to justify the court's decision to not excuse 
him for cause) (emphasis in original). Furthermore, if there are questions as to a juror's 
impartiality, they are to be resolved in the defendant's favor. Id. Therefore, there 
cannot be, as the State contends, a presumption of impartiality once a potential juror 
who has expressed a bias offers an affirmation of impartiality. 
II. 
The State Incorrectly Asserted That The District Court's Decision To Not Dismiss 
Juror #34 For Cause Was Appropriate Because Juror #34 Did Not Give An Unequivocal 
Affirmation That She Could Be Impartial 
A Introduction 
Juror #34 expressed two different forms of bias: her predisposition to believe the 
alleged victim's version of events over Mr. Jackson's (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.14 - p.108, 
L.2), and her willingness to vote to convict Mr. Jackson even if the State had not proved 
its case beyond a reasonable doubt because of the nature of the charged offense. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.16 - p.130, L.14.) The State contends that Juror #34 offered 
sufficient affirmations of impartiality, thereby justifying the district court's decision to 
deny Mr. Jackson's motion to dismiss Juror #34 for cause.2 (Resp. Br., pp.4-9.) It is 
2 Juror #33, who harbored the same biases as Juror #34, was dismissed for cause. 
(See Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.24 - p.108, L.5; Tr., Vol.1, p.118, L.25 - p.119, L.18.) The 
difference between the two is that the prosecutor objected to the motion to strike 
Juror #34, and did not object to the motion to strike Juror #33. (Tr., Vol.1, p.119, 
Ls.15-16.) 
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mistaken because Juror #34 did not offer any assertion of impartiality in regard to her 
predisposition to believe the alleged victim over Mr. Jackson and her assertion of 
impartiality in regard to the State's burden of proof was not unequivocal. 
B. Juror #34 Did Not Offer Any Assertions Of Impartiality In Regard To Her Stated 
Predisposition To Believe The Alleged Victim Over Mr. Jackson 
The State contends that the questioning, memorialized in the transcript at 
Tr., Vol.1, p.131, L.18 - p.132, L.2, constitutes an affirmation of impartiality in regard to 
Juror #34's expressed bias as to which witness she was going to believe. (Resp. 
Br., p.8 n.2.) That is not the case, since that section of the transcript only addresses 
Juror #34's view on the State's burden of proof: 
[Prosecutor]: ... But you do understand that I have the 
burden. I have to show that he's guilty. 
A Right. 
[Prosecutor]: And if I don't do that, you have to vote not 
guilty. 
A Right. 
[Prosecutor]: That's your duty. 
A (JUROR NODS HEAD AFFIRMATIVELY.) 
[Prosecutor]: Right? A Right. 
[Prosecutor]: And you can do that. 
A Yes. 
[Prosecutor]: Thank you. Do you feel like you could be 
fair and impartial in this case if it came down to a close 
question? 
A Yes. 
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(Tr., Vol.1, p.131, L.18 - p.132, L.2 (emphasis added).) These comments immediately 
follow Juror #34's assertion that she would vote to convict Mr. Jackson even if the State 
failed to meet the burden of proof because of the nature of the case. (Tr., Vol.1, p.128, 
L.17 - p.129, L.8.) These comments are also separated from Juror #34's comments as 
to which witness she would believe by a significant period of time and discussion with 
other jurors. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.108, L.3- p.126, L.19.) In fact, the prosecutor 
had questioned Juror #34 during that interval and did not secure an affirmation of 
impartiality in regard to the juror's bias to believe the alleged victim at that time. 
(SeeTr., Vol.1, p.116, L.19 - p.118, L.14) As such, there is no logical connection 
linking the answers quoted above with Juror #34's expression of bias to believe the 
alleged victim, absent a specific reference to those prior comments by either of the 
speakers. Therefore, understood in context, this affirmation only speaks to one of Juror 
#34's biases: if the question of whether the State has met its burden is close, would 
Juror#34beabletoremainfairand impartial. (See Tr., Vol.128, L.17-p.132, L.12.) 
At no point after Juror #34 asserted, "I think with the nature of this case if it's 
purely his word against hers and that's it, then I would - yeah, I would believe the little 
girl over a grown man,"3 (Tr., Vol.1, p.107, L.24 - p.108, L.2), did she retract that 
3 Contrast Juror #34's response with the very specific affirmation of impartiality that 
Juror #57 gave to that same question: "No. I would say not. I've also had firsthand 
experience with a child who wasn't honest about something like that so I've experienced 
both sides of that so that is the reason why I believe I could be impartial because I'm 
open to listening to both sides of that." (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.11-16.) Juror #57's 
statement is an unequivocal assertion of impartiality in that regard, which would allay 
concerns about whether she could be impartial on that point. Hauser, 143 Idaho at 61 0 
(requiring this type of assurance when assessing juror bias). Juror #34 gave no 
such affirmation. ( See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.116, L.19 - p.118, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.126, 
L.20 - p.132, L.17.) 
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statement or affirm that she could lay that bias aside. (See generally Tr., Vol.1, p.116, 
L.19 - p.118, L.14; Tr., Vol.1, p.126, L.20 - p.132, L.17.) The case law in this regard is 
clear: when the juror in question "was never asked to make, and did not make that 
commitment" to set aside a particular bias and decide the case only on the evidence 
presented, the decision to not excuse that juror for cause is erroneous. Hauser, 143 
Idaho at 611. Therefore, since Juror #34 did not offer an affirmation of impartiality in 
regard to her predisposition to believe the alleged victim over Mr. Jackson, she was 
biased and should have been removed for cause. See id.; compare Nightengale, 151 
Idaho at 353-54 (holding that, where the juror in question offered a specific, unequivocal 
affirmation of impartiality, the district court did not err by denying a motion to strike the 
juror for cause). 
C. Juror #34's Affirmation Of Impartiality In Regard To Her Bias In Regard To The 
State's Burden Of Proof Was Not Unequivocal 
Notably, Juror #34 reiterated her bias regarding her inability to hold the State to 
its burden of proof after offering an affirmation of impartiality in that regard. (Tr., Vol.1, 
p.117, L.22 - p.118, L.10 (Juror #34's initial affirmation of an ability to hold the State to 
its burden); Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.8 (Juror #34 indicating she would be willing 
to vote to convict even if not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of Mr. Jackson's 
guilt); Tr., Vol.1, p.131, L.18 - p.132, L.12 (Juror #34's second affirmation of an ability to 
set aside that bias).) Contrary to the State's assertions, (see, e.g., Resp. Br., p.9), 
this waffling on whether or not she could be impartial and hold the State to its 
burden of proof reveals that Juror #34's affirmations were not unequivocal and failed to 
demonstrate that she could lay aside her bias and deliberate with "entire impartiality." 
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Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610 (emphasis in original). In fact, Juror #34 expressly qualified 
her affirmation in this regard, when, in response to the prosecutor's attempt at 
rehabilitating her, she stated: "I'd like to say that I could follow that oath but with what 
[defense counsel] was proposing, if that were to happen, / don't know if -- if I would be 
able to just keep that beyond a reasonable doubt concrete mind set." (Tr., Vol.1, p.130, 
Ls.10-14 (emphasis added).)4 
The scenario defense counsel presented to Juror #34, the scenario upon which 
she qualified her affirmation of impartiality, was: 
If you were afraid [Mr. Jackson] did this but you don't think [the 
prosecution proved it, would you find him guilty anyway? ... [M]aybe your 
job would be to make up the difference ... If they gave you enough to 
hang your hat on, even if they didn't really prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt, just to make sure, just to make sure, that he doesn't get away with 
it. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.6.) Juror #34's response was "Yeah. I -- you know 
just because of the nature of this case."5 (Tr., Vol.1, p.129, Ls.7-8.) This is the point 
that Juror #34 explicitly told the prosecutor that she could not unequivocally disavow. 
(Tr., Vol.1, p.130, Ls.10-14.) Because Juror #34 did not unequivocally affirm that she 
could set aside that bias and be impartial, the district court's failure to remove her for 
cause was erroneous. See Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610. Therefore, since Juror #34 had 
expressed bias toward Mr. Jackson and did not give an unequivocal affirmation that she 
4 Upon reviewing the transcripts, the State is correct that this statement was made in 
response to a question posited to Juror #34 by the prosecutor. Mr. Jackson apologizes 
for his misstatement in that regard in the Appellant's Brief. 
5 The inference from the context of this statement is that Juror #34 was affirming that 
she would find Mr. Jackson guilty even if the State had not proved his guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt simply because of the nature of the charges against him. (See 
Tr., Vol.1, p.128, L.17 - p.129, L.8.) 
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could set that bias aside and be entirely impartial, the district court's decision to deny 
Mr. Jackson's motion to strike her for cause was erroneous. See id. 
111. 
The State Incorrectly Asserted That The District Court's Decision To Not Dismiss 
Juror #34 For Cause Was Harmless Because Juror #54 And Juror #57 Did Not Give 
Unequivocal Affirmations That They Could Be Impartial 
A. Introduction 
The State contends that the, because Juror #54 and Juror #57 made affirmations 
of impartiality, there is no clear indication of bias on the record, and implicitly, that the 
district court's error in refusing to remove Juror #34 for cause was harmless. (See 
Resp. Br., pp.9-15.) However, neither Juror #54 nor Juror #57 made unequivocal 
affirmations of impartiality such that they would be able to set aside their expressed 
biases and decide the case with "entire impartiality." Compare Hauser, 143 Idaho at 
610-11. The State must prove harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 
386 U.S. at 24; Joy, 2013 Opinion No. 78 at p.12. Additionally, questions remaining as 
to the juror's ability to remain fair and impartial are resolved in the defendant's favor. 
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. As a result, the equivocal nature of Juror #54 and Juror 
#57's affirmations leaves questions as to their ability to remain impartial means that the 
State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court's error in not 
removing Juror #34 for cause was harmless. 
B. Juror #57 Did Not Offer An Unequivocal Affirmation Of Impartiality 
Juror #57 told the district court "I believe I can be impartial; however, I guess my 
worry would be that you know in this full swing of trial, I don't know how I would feel 
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later." (Tr., Vol.1, p.70, Ls.14-19.) Subsequently, in response to the prosecutor's 
question, inquiring as to whether she felt able to maintain her composure during the 
trial, she reaffirmed the qualification: "Gosh, I don't know that I could say that without 
have had an experience. But I believe I could just as -- but as a mom, period, it would 
be difficult." (Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.13-19.) The State contends that, because Juror #57 
"indicated a belief that she would be able to 'hold [her] emotions in check' ([Tr., Vol1.], 
p.71, Ls.1-22); that she would '[a]bsolutely' 'listen to all the testimony, [and] see the 
evidence before [she] made any type of decision' ([Tr., Vol1.], p.71, L.23 - p.72, L.5)," 
she had made an unequivocal affirmation of impartiality. (Resp. Br., p.12.) That is not 
the case, since those statements do not indicate that Juror #57 would be able to set 
aside her emotions, as opposed to just try to set them aside, and thus, do not 
unequivocally indicate that she would be entirely impartial. 
Juror #57's response is similar to the response given in Hauser, which the Court 
of Appeals determined was insufficient to allay the concerns of bias. See Hauser, 143 
Idaho at 610-11. The juror in question in Hauser "agreed to try to be fair, but when 
asked to endorse the idea that everything a police officer says is not necessarily true, 
[the juror] declined . . . . The voir dire produced no assurance that the juror would lay 
aside his prejudices and render an impartial verdict." Id. (emphasis added). As a result 
of the juror's failure to assure the district court that he could lay aside his prejudices, the 
Court of Appeals concluded: "In our view, when a juror admits bias, and gives no 
unequivocal assurance of the ability to be impartial despite several efforts by the court 
or counsel to elicit such an assurance, an inference that he will not act with entire 
impartiality becomes inescapable" and that juror is impermissibly biased. Id. (emphasis 
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in original). Similarly, Juror #57 offered no unequivocal assurance that she would lay 
aside her bias, despite the efforts of the prosecutor in voir dire. (See generally 
Tr., Vol.1, p.70, L.6 - p.73, L.18.) 
Rather, Juror #57 indicated only that she believed she could keep her emotions 
in check (i.e., that she would try to be fair). (See Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.1-22.) That, as the 
Hauser Court made clear, does not constitute an unequivocal affirmation of impartiality. 
Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. Additionally, Juror #57's promise to listen to all the 
evidence before making a decision does not speak to Juror #57's concerns that her 
emotions would not factor into her decision.6 Furthermore, Juror #57 expressly 
qualified her affirmations of impartiality: (See Tr., Vol.1, p.71, Ls.13-19 ("I don't know 
that I could say that .... ").)7 Precedent is clear, that when a juror declines to give an 
unequivocal affirmation of impartiality, "an inference that he will not act with entire 
impartiality becomes inescapable." Hauser, 143 Idaho at 611. Since there is still an 
inference that Juror #57 could not have set aside her emotions and deicide the case 
only on the applicable law and the evidence presented, and since such questions are to 
be resolved in favor of the defendant, the State has failed to prove that Juror #57 was 
not an impermissibly-biased member of Mr. Jackson's jury panel. See Hauser, 143 
Idaho at 610-11. As such, it failed to prove that the district court's erroneous decision to 
6 It is improper for the jury to decide a case based on emotion, rather than the 
applicable law and evidence presented. Cf. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 480 
(2012) (it is misconduct for a prosecutor to appeal for a decision based on any factor 
other than the applicable law and the evidence presented); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 
82, 87 (Ct. App. 2007) (it is misconduct to urge a verdict to be reached on emotion, 
~assion, or prejudice). 
This qualification of the affirmation is clear from the record, which means her bias may 
be argued for the first time on appeal. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
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not remove Juror #34 for cause was not harmless, and the case should be remanded 
for a new trial. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Joy, 2013 Opinion No. 78 at p.12. 
C. Juror #54 Did Not Offer An Unequivocal Affirmation Of Impartiality 
Juror #54 responded to the prosecutor's question regarding the familial 
relationship between the prosecutor and the juror's family and whether it would "sway 
[her] in any sense." (Tr., Vol.1, p.76, L.9 - p.77, L.7.) The juror's response was not 
unequivocal: "It might." (Tr., Vol.1, p.77, L.8.) And while, as the State pointed out, 
Juror #54 did answer the question "And do you think that you could be fair to 
Mr. Jackson" in the affirmative, there was no indication that she would set aside the bias 
she had identified.8 Compare Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. Without that affirmation, 
there remains a concern that the juror is biased, and thus, the juror inappropriately sat 
on the case. See Hauser, 143 Idaho at 610-11. Therefore, the State has failed to prove 
that Juror #54 was not an impermissibly-biased member of Mr. Jackson's jury panel. 
See id. As a result it failed to prove that the district court's erroneous decision to not 
remove Juror #34 for cause was not harmless, and the case should be remanded for a 
new trial. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Joy, 2013 Opinion No. 78 at p.12. 
8 Contrast Juror #54's responses with the affirmation Juror #57 gave in regard to her 
ability to listen to both parties' witnesses. (Tr., Vol.1, p.72, Ls.11-16 ("No. I would say 
not. I've also had firsthand experience with a child who wasn't honest about something 
like that so I've experienced both sides of that so that is the reason why I believe I could 
be impartial because I'm open to listening to both sides of that.").) Juror #57's 
statement would be an unequivocal affirmation of impartiality on the issue addressed; 
Juror #54's statement, "It might," is not. That qualification, and thus, Juror #54's bias, is 
clear from the record, which means her bias may be argued for the first time on appeal. 
See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. 
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IV. 
The State Incorrectly Asserted That Mr. Jackson's Filings Were Insufficient To Merit The 
Appointment Of Counsel On His Rule 35 Motion 
The State does not take issue with Mr. Jackson's assertions that the Rule 35 
proceedings are a critical stage of the criminal prosecution process or that Mr. Jackson 
would be entitled to the assistance of counsel upon demonstrating his indigency. (See 
generally Resp. Br., pp.15-24.) Rather, it takes issue with the information Mr. Jackson 
presented, asserting it is insufficient to merit a finding of indigency pursuant to I.C. § 19-
854.9 (Resp. Br., pp.15-24.) However, Mr. Jackson did provide a completed affidavit 
form (though not notarized) to the court, asserting that he had no bank accounts, 
assets, or other forms of security. (R., p.192.) Mr. Jackson also provided a letter 
explaining why the affidavit was not notarized (he had been placed in protective custody 
after he was attacked by other inmates and believed he was unable to arrange a 
meeting with the notary public before the time to file his Rule 35 motion elapsed). 
(Letter from Defendant to Alexandria Lewis filed December 7, 2011 (attached to the 
record as a Miscellaneous Exhibit).) 
9 It should be noted that I.C. § 19-854 was recently amended and now provides a 
presumption that persons in the same situation Mr. Jackson was when he made this 
request are indigent. See I.C. § 19-854(2)(c), as amended July 1, 2013. Mr. Jackson 
does not claim that the presumption should apply to his case, but it does indicate that 
the intent of the statute was to increase access to legal counsel for indigent persons, 
not, as the State suggests (see Resp. Br., pp.15-24) inhibit it on purely procedural 
bases. See, e.g., State v. Elisondo, 114 Idaho 412, 425 (1988) ("The mandate of the 
statute is clear: the public defender should not be kept at bay until a formal indigency 
hearing has been held pursuant to I.C. § 19-854. A public defender should be allowed, 
nay, encouraged, to interview indigents who have requested counsel prior to any court 
appearance or formal indigency hearing.") (emphasis in italics from original; emphasis 
in bold added). 
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This letter demonstrates that Mr. Jackson was not only making efforts to file a 
complete set of documents with his motion, but that he was also aware with the 
restrictions placed on such motions, and that he was making his best efforts to conform 
with both requirements. Coincidentally, this situation is one of the reasons why the 
district courts are encouraged to appoint counsel for indigent defendants. Because "few 
indigents can marshal the evidence of mitigating circumstances necessary to win a 
reduction of sentence," they should be afforded the guidance and assistance of counsel 
at such times. United States v. Morales, 498 F.Supp. 139, 142 (E.D.N.Y. 1980); see 
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 923 n.3 (Ct. App. 1992); cf. Charboneau v. State, 140 
Idaho 789, 792-93 (2004) (quoting Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679 (2001)) (when 
addressing the question of appointing counsel in post-conviction, "the trial court should 
keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be 
conclusory and incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged 
because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner 
simply does not know what are the essential elements of a claim." To prevent the 
erroneous dismissal of actions in such cases, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the 
question of appointing counsel should be resolved before ruling on the merits of the 
claim). Ultimately, however, Mr. Jackson had, at least, made assertions of his indigency 
to the district court. 
Furthermore, the district court actually recognized that Mr. Jackson had no 
assets with which to proceed on his own: "The Court considers Mr. Jackson indigent for 
the purposes of an appeal where the legal fees would be thousands of dollars and 
Mr. Jackson has no income." (R., p.193 (emphasis added).) As the defendant's income 
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is the first factor listed for the district court to consider in regard to indigency, it seems 
as though the district court did consider the likelihood that Mr. Jackson was, in fact, 
indigent. However, it asserted: "For a Rule 35 motion, however, Mr. Jackson may have 
sufficient resources to pay for private counsel." (R., p.193 (emphasis added).) This 
assertion does not constitute a finding that Mr. Jackson was not indigent, but an 
assertion that there was insufficient evidence to make such a determination. 
The State argues that this was a sufficient basis to deny the request for counsel. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) It relies on Quinlivan v. State, 94 Idaho 334 (1971). In that 
case, the district court's decision to deny the request for counsel were deemed 
appropriate after it had held a hearing and inquired into Mr. Quinlivan's financial 
situation. See Quinlivan, 94 Idaho at 334-35. The district court in Mr. Jackson's case 
only determined it had insufficient information to determine whether Mr. Jackson was, in 
fact, indigent. Therefore, it could have, at the very least, held a hearing such as was 
held in Quinlivan to gather sufficient evidence to make its determination. As such, it 
erroneously denied his request for an attorney, or should have at least requested more 
information on this point so that it could actually determine whether Mr. Jackson was 
indigent for purposes of the Rule 35 motion. However, the record as it is only indicates 
that Mr. Jackson was indigent and the district court was depriving him of his right to 
counsel because of an imperfect filing. 
Additionally, by denying Mr. Jackson's request because of the imperfect filing, 
particularly in light of Mr. Jackson's explanation for the incomplete nature of his filing, 
the district court is elevating form over substance, behavior which both the Idaho 
Supreme Court and Idaho Court of Appeals have criticized. See, e.g., In re Weick, 142 
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Idaho 275, 279 (2005) (the Idaho courts "will not exalt form over substance"); 
Weller v. State, 146 Idaho 652, 655 (Ct. App. 2008). In fact, when it comes to post-
judgment pleadings, like a Rule 35 motion, filed by incarcerated defendants, like 
Mr. Jackson, the rule is clear: "Idaho appellate courts have long held that, with respect 
to post-judgment pleadings filed by convicted defendants, substance governs over 
form." Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 190 (Ct. App. 2008)). The substance of 
Mr. Jackson's pleadings, accompanied as it was by an explanation of the incomplete 
nature of the form, should have been sufficient to merit consideration on the merits of 
his motion and request for counsel. See id. The district court's decision to deny him 
that assistance violated Mr. Jackson's statutory and constitutional rights to assistance of 
counsel. (See App. Br., pp.17-22.) Therefore, this case should, at least, be remanded 
for a hearing on Mr. Jackson's Rule 35 motion after he has been afforded the 
assistance of counsel. 
The State also contends that decision to deny Mr. Jackson the aid of an attorney 
should be upheld because the underlying motion was, by its account, frivolous. (See 
Resp. Br, pp.24-26.) First, since the point of having counsel is to help the indigent 
defendant marshal such evidence for presentation to the court, see, e.g., Morales, 498 
F.Supp. at 142; see also Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-94, the district court should 
resolve the motion for counsel before ruling on the merits of the motion. Cf, e.g., 
State v. Judd, 148 Idaho 22, 24-25 (Ct. App. 2009) (hold that "a district court presented 
with a request for appointed counsel in a post-conviction action must address that 
request before ruling on the substantive issues in the case and errs if it denies a petition 
on the merits before ruling on the applicant's request for counsel."); see also 
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Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-94 (holding the same so that counsel can help the 
petitioner identify issues and present the necessary evidence in support of those issues, 
whereas, the pro se defendant is usually unable to do so). Mr. Jackson indicated as 
much to the district court: "I need help & more time." (R., p.191; see also Letter from 
Defendant to Alexandria Lewis filed December 7, 2011 (defendant asserting he is 
unable to get everything he wants to include with his motion together before the filing 
deadline due to circumstances beyond his control).) As such, the State's argument that 
a decision on the merits should justify the decision to deny counsel is misplaced. 
Furthermore, Mr. Jackson did present new or additional evidence in support of 
his motion: the diagnosis by "Dr. Puffer." (See Letter from defendant to Janet Meserve, 
filed December 12, 2011, p.13, 2011, (attached to the record as a Miscellaneous 
Exhibit).) The only time this information was presented was during the first trial, which 
ended in a mistrial. See Letter from defendant to Janet Meserve, filed December 12, 
2011, p.13, 2011, (attached to the record as a Miscellaneous Exhibit).) There is no 
indication that information was considered at the sentencing hearing, nor should it be 
assumed that it was considered at that time. The effect of a mistrial is to undo the trial 
for some error, and thus, is generally given no effect. See, e.g., State v. Fairchild, 121 
Idaho 960, 963 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 (1982)) ("The 
general rule is that a defendant's motion for mistrial removes any bar by the double 
jeopardy clause .... ") Thus, it should not be presumed that the district court did so 
without a request by counsel that the district court take judicial notice of such facts from 
the mistrial or an assertion by the district court that it had done so sua sponte. As such, 
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the information in the letter to Janet Meserve constitutes new or additional information 
presented in support of the Rule 35. 
Therefore, the fact that the motion does not have all the information the State 
would prefer to see in such filings is not, in and of itself, a reason to uphold the district 
court's decision to deny Mr. Jackson's request for the assistance of counsel. Rather, 
the State's arguments actually further demonstrate why counsel should have been 
appointed. As a result, this Court should, at least, reverse the decision to deny the 
request for counsel on the Rule 35 motion and remand for further proceedings on the 
Rule 35 motion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Jackson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction and 
remand his case for further proceedings. Alternatively, he requests that the order 
denying his Rule 35 motion be vacated and the matter remanded for a hearing with the 
assistance of an attorney. 
DATED this 14th day of August, 2013. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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